TOP SECRET

C/S/Pres Master
(DCI's corrections

3 February 1967

DCI'S BRIEFING FOR THE
DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

C O N T E N T S

plus backstoppers on BW/CW Capability - A-1 - A-6
Soviet Research & Development

Delivery time about 45 1/2 min
No Graphics planned

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DCI BRIEFING FOR
DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE,
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INTRODUCTION

I. I understand you wish me to discuss today the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and Communist China, touching on the related economic and political considerations.

A. I propose to give you the general thrust of the present situation and probable future trends.

B. As you know, we could easily spend a full day on the detailed strength and hardware of the Russian and Chinese military establishments.

C. I feel it will be more useful to present an over-all picture, after which we can go into any details you may wish on the basis of your questions.

SOVIET STRATEGIC ATTACK

ICBM's

I. The new Soviet ICBMs--which we call the third generation--are coming into operational status now at a rapid rate.

A. At this time last year, the count had been stable at about 225 for a good year and a half.

1. The Soviets at that point had completed their deployment of the first- and second-generation missiles.

2. In 1964, however, they began their new program, comprising two new missile systems.

B. One of these, we call the SS-9. It is a large and accurate missile which can carry [redacted] warhead 5,000 miles, or [redacted] warhead about 7,000 miles. 25X1 25X1 25X1

C. The other, the SS-11, is less accurate and smaller. We estimate the maximum yield of its warhead at [redacted] 25X1

II. The silos for these new ICBMs become operational, at present rate of construction, two years or a little more after they are started. As a result,

the estimated number of operational launchers has already moved up from that plateau of 225 to about 385.

A. Our current National Intelligence Estimate concludes that by the middle of this year the Soviet Union will have about 425 to 485 ICBMs ready to launch. By mid-1968, the figure should be 670 to 765.

1. These short-term estimates, of course, ~~can be~~ are based on the number of silos already under construction, ~~making allowance for acceleration or delay in the pace of completion.~~

B. At longer range, we estimate that the Soviet ICBM force will have somewhere between 800 and 1,100 operational launchers four years from now, in mid-1971 to be specific.

III. The numbers, however, do not tell the whole story. The present deployment is also changing the character of the Soviet ICBM force.

A. First, it is going to be harder to knock out. All of the new launchers are in hardened silos, with ~~and while they are all located in~~ ~~new~~ groups at the existing missile complexes

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

B. Secondly, the main emphasis of the new deployment is on the SS-11 system. By mid-1968, there may be as many as 400 of these, making up more than half of the Soviet force.

1. The SS-9 system has the accuracy and the big warhead needed to attack hardened military targets.

2. In contrast, the SS-11, with less accuracy and a much smaller warhead yield, is more

suitable for large, soft targets. In other words, it is a "city-buster."

C. The Soviets, by putting their missile force in silos and concentrating on the SS-11, are working for what we call "assured destruction"--that is, the capability to destroy a significant portion of the population and resources of the United States even if U.S. missiles should strike first.

IV. This improvement of strategic attack capabilities is bound to give the Soviet leaders greatly increased confidence that they have achieved a sufficient "assured destruction" capability to serve as a deterrent.

A. We do not believe, however, that between now and the mid-1970s the Soviets themselves expect to be strong enough to consider the deliberate initiation of a war against the United States.

V. Let me review briefly the status of the remainder of the Soviet capability for strategic attack.

MRBM/IRBM

A. There have been no major changes during the past year in the Soviet Intermediate-range and Medium-range ballistic missile force.

1. There are about 100 intermediate and 600 medium-range operational launchers.

2. About 90 percent of the sites are in the Western USSR, constituting a massive threat to Europe.

3. We do not expect much change over the next 10 years in the size of the MRBM/IRBM force, but again, the character will probably change.

4. As the existing systems become obsolescent, launchers on soft pads will be phased out. Present research and development also suggests that the Soviets are working for mobile systems, and solid fuel. They have paraded prototypes of mobile missiles, including one which they called a mobile ICBM, and they have tested a solid-fueled missile to about 3,000 miles, which is right on the borderline between Intermediate and Intercontinental range.

Submarines:

B. The Soviet submarine force has a growing missile capability.

1. A nuclear-powered submarine now under construction is the first unit of a new class which will apparently carry eight or more tubes for submerged launch of a new missile with a range of 1,000 to 2,000 miles.

2. A few operational submarines have been converted to fire a 700-mile ballistic missile while submerged.

3. The rest of the missile units have to launch from the surface.

4. There are 36 submarines, with about 100 launchers altogether, for ballistic missiles. Most of these missiles have a range of 350 miles.

5. Another 47 submarines carry a total of about 250 cruise missiles, with the primary mission of attacking naval task forces. Their missile has a range of about 450 miles.

6. About 45 of the 360 Soviet submarines are nuclear-powered. The power plants are noisier than ours,

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25X1B

Long Range Aviation

C. As for strategic air threat, Soviet Long Range Aviation now consists of 950 to 1,000 bomber and tanker aircraft. The number is declining slowly, and there has been no evidence of any new Soviet heavy bomber program.

1. The Soviets have about 200 heavy bombers, some of which are used as tankers. We estimate that they could mount a strike of about 100 aircraft on two-way missions against the United States.

2. The rest of Long Range Aviation consists of medium-range aircraft, featuring the super-sonic-dash BLINDER medium bomber. We expect the mediums would be used primarily to attack U.S. and allied targets on the Eurasian landmass.

3. The Air Force, however, has two major reservations ~~on the Estimate~~. One is the Air Force belief that Long Range Aviation is likely to have a new heavy bomber in the next few years. The other is the Air Force

calculation that in all-out war, 300 medium bombers could be used to supplement the 100 heavies in an attack on targets in the United States.

4. The Soviets have developed air-to-surface missiles to extend the operational usefulness of manned aircraft. They appear to be having trouble, however, with the missile designed for the BLINDER. The principal operational missile at present delivers a nuclear warhead about 350 miles, with a terminal speed approaching twice the speed of sound.

SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE

I. The status of Soviet strategic defense is the subject of a sharp difference of opinion in the intelligence community over Soviet anti-missile capability. So that we can have a clear understanding of the controversy, let me point out that it involves two separate missile systems.

Moscow System

A. First, around Moscow the Soviets are indeed deploying an array of missiles and radars conclusively demonstrated to be an ABM system.

B. Part of the system should be ready to go this year, and the entire complex by about 1970.

C. When it is finished, Moscow will be protected by about 100 solid-fuel missiles that can reach out several hundred miles and explode a nuclear warhead above the atmosphere.

1. We think the system would have a good capability against a limited number of existing missiles, but it doesn't have what it takes to cope with a major attack, or with the penetration aids that incoming missiles will have in the future.

2. The intelligence community is agreed on this evaluation of the Moscow system.

D. The system starts with early warning radars in northwestern Russia that cover the avenues of approach for missiles coming from the continental United States. They can probably detect a missile as much as [redacted] 25X1

1. These radars [redacted] 25X1 should be operational this year or early in 1968.

E. Nearer Moscow, there is a big radar which acquires the incoming missile from the early warning facilities, tracks it, and [redacted] 25X1

F. Finally, at a dozen sites forming a ring about 50 miles from the center of Moscow, are the engagement radars, which aim the missiles on their nearby launchers and track them to the target.

G. We have recently calculated that this system --including all of the radars but not the developing and testing--will have cost the Soviets the equivalent of about three billion

U.S. dollars, from the start of construction through 1970.

H. This system I have just described is unique to Moscow. You only have to think for a minute about what Moscow has meant in Russian history to realize that the Soviets will defend Moscow with any system that might help, regardless of cost, effectiveness, or feasibility.

1. We have seen no indication that this system is going to show up anywhere else in the Soviet Union.

Tallinn System

II. Now let's leave Moscow to look at another defensive missile deployment. This one is being deployed extensively. We call it the Tallinn system after the city in Estonia where the first such complex was built. The Tallinn system is the object of the controversy I have mentioned, because so far there just isn't enough hard evidence to be positive of its purpose.

A. CIA believes that this system is more likely to be a defense against high-flying, high-speed aircraft and other aerodynamic vehicles. ~~This is the conclusion of the current Estimate~~

B. The other view is that the weapon is basically an anti-ballistic missile, with a secondary mission against aerodynamic vehicles. This is the view of DIA, the Army, and the Air Force.

25X1B C. [redacted]

~~1. Neither side can line up enough evidence to disprove the other view.~~

III. So far we have evidence of 26 complexes for the Tallinn system. The deployment pattern forms a forward defense across the northwestern Soviet Union, with others situated for local defense of specific targets.

A. We think that more than 20 of these complexes can be operational this year. At the present pace of deployment, the Soviet Union could have about 75 of them by 1972.

1. Most of the complexes have three sites, with six launchers at each site. The 26 complexes now under construction will apparently have a total of about 550 launchers.

B. On the basis of the evidence we have, we believe the Tallinn system missile will probably

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1. ~~The Estimate judges that~~ It could engage manned aircraft flying at three and a half times the speed of sound.

C. ~~We need to know much more about the missile itself, and the associated radars, before we can make definitive judgments. As far as we can determine~~ Further, some of the Tallinn system locations do not have the early warning and long-range radar coverage that an effective ABM system would have to have.

Other Air Defense

IV. The rest of the Soviet strategic defense picture is relatively static.

A. New jet fighter aircraft which are now becoming operational will give the Soviet Union improved all-weather capability, and greater interceptor range.

B. There are about 1,000 sites in the Soviet Union for the SA-2 surface-to-air missile system. Performance in North Vietnam has not been particularly impressive--more than 1,500 missiles have been fired to bring down a maximum

of 44 manned aircraft. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] 25X1

C. The SA-3 system is supposed to be more effective at low altitudes, but the Soviets have deployed it to only about 110 sites in the Soviet Union. This suggests that it has not come up to expectations.

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

I. About two thirds of Soviet military manpower--some 2 million men--are in what we call general purposes forces: the ground forces, tactical air, and tactical navy.

A. The number of divisions has remained fairly constant. There are 109 divisions almost completely equipped and ready for early commitment to battle.

1. Their manning ranges from about 60 percent of wartime levels in the Soviet interior, to 90 percent in Eastern Europe.

2. Another 32 cadre divisions have only about 20 percent of full strength.

B. The Soviets are gradually but steadily improving the ground forces weapons.

C. They are also making a start in developing strike forces which they could use for action at distant points--a Soviet shortcoming until now.

1. Airlift is being improved, a marine corps has been created, and there has been an increase in airborne and amphibious maneuvers.

D. The Soviets continue to help the modernization and improvement of the East European satellite forces. The East Europeans can now contribute about one million men in 42 divisions for Warsaw Pact needs.

SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING

I. Since the limited test ban treaty was signed in mid-1963, we have detected 36 underground nuclear tests in the Soviet Union. Most of them have

25X1 [redacted]

A. The Soviets have run their underground test program at a leisurely pace--slightly over one shot a month over the past two years. In comparison, the United States averaged more than three underground tests a month during the same period.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

B. Last October the U.S.S.R. conducted its largest underground test, [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

1. For this shot, the Soviets reactivated their test site at Novaya Zemlya in the western arctic. Novaya Zemlya was the location of many of the U.S.S.R.'s earlier explosions in the atmosphere, but had not been used for underground testing since two [redacted] shots there in 1964.

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

C. In early 1965, the Soviets conducted the first test in a program to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear explosions.

1. This test, the most spectacular of the series, [redacted] which dammed the Shagan River near the Semipalatinsk test site.

25X1

D. Last September 30, the Soviets used a nuclear explosion to put out a fire which had been burning at a natural gas well for several years.

E. There were underground shots at Ufa, just west of the Urals, in 1965, and at Azgir, north of the Caspian, in 1966,

25X1

25X1

II. The facilities we have seen for the production of both plutonium and enriched uranium probably are adequate to meet the U.S.S.R.'s needs in the foreseeable future. We know of no new facilities under construction.

SOVIET ECONOMY

I. The Soviet economy continues to have problems, notably with the allocation of critical resources. Over the next few years we do not expect that (growth of the) Soviet Gross National Product will match the performance of the 1950's.

A. The Soviet GNP and total Soviet industrial production are each a little less than half of ours.

B. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union virtually matches our defense effort, mainly because the Soviet consumer is way down in the pecking order when it comes to allocating output.

C. Military and space spending remained fairly constant between 1962 and 1965, but we estimate that outlays in 1966 were up about 7 percent.

1. The state budget for 1967 includes an admitted increase of 1.1 billion rubles for defense, and hidden allocations elsewhere in the budget may make the actual increase considerably bigger.

D. For our purposes today, let me just say that we conclude that the Soviet economy will come

up with whatever expenditures are considered desirable for defense, no matter what the condition of the rest of the economy.

SOVIET POLICY

I. In the Kremlin today, the General Secretary of the Party, Leonid Brezhnev, seems to have the most important voice in making key assignments, and he is getting more and more of the spotlight.

A. The Soviet leadership, however, was brought into power in reaction to Khrushchev's erratic personal leadership, and it is still functioning by and large as a collective government.

B. That means that it is a relatively cautious government, not given to radical departures from established policies and procedures.

C. The present leadership stands better with the military, as far as we can judge, and this is largely because it has dropped Khrushchev's attempts to cut back on military spending.

II. Domestic pre-occupation centers on the economy. It has been so hard to reach decisions on resource allocations, that the Soviets are in the second year of their present Five Year Plan, and the Plan itself hasn't received final approval yet.

III. In foreign affairs, the overriding concern right now is the dispute with Communist China.

A. Tension between Moscow and Peking has intensified markedly in recent months. The Soviets feel they have gotten the upper hand in the world Communist movement, and they are beginning to behave somewhat more boldly.

1. For instance, they are again trying to convoke an international meeting to condemn the Chinese.

2. The Soviets have exploited Peking's rejection of appeals for united Communist action in support of North Vietnam.

3. Peking's retort has been that Moscow is secretly conspiring with the United States against the Asian Communists.

4. Moscow, to avoid giving any substance to the Chinese charges, has been taking the line publicly that there can be little advance in U.S.-Soviet relations until the Vietnam conflict is settled.

B. The Kremlin has made it clear in private, however, that the Soviet Union wants to keep lines of communication with Washington open, despite the strains and constraints imposed

by the Vietnamese fighting and sensitivity to charges of Soviet-U.S. collusion.

1. If it weren't for Vietnam, the Soviet leaders would probably prefer to resume the dialogue with Washington on matters which are of greater concern to Soviet national interests, such as European security, arms control, and East-West trade.

2. The agreements recently reached on civil air routes and the peaceful use of outer space showed that limited cooperation is still possible.

CHINESE COMMUNIST ADVANCED WEAPONS

I. The Chinese Communists are making a concerted effort--on their own and with overriding priorities--to develop modern weapons for strategic attack. They are devoting increasing resources to missiles and nuclear weapons.

A. [redacted] 25X1

B. They are, therefore, making progress toward a nuclear strike capability.

C. We estimate that they could begin to deploy a medium-range ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead this year, and their first crude ICBMs in the early 1970s.

II. The fourth Chinese nuclear test was a device detonated near Lop Nor on October 26. The Chinese claim it was delivered by ballistic missile.

A. As nearly as we can ascertain, the claim is probably true.

B. The vehicle was probably a Soviet-model MRBM, [redacted] 25X1 25X1

~~1 It could, of course, have been a short-range missile fired from a launch point~~ much nearer the detonation.

III.

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

B. The tests indicate that the Chinese can manufacture nuclear bombs which can be carried by their medium bombers--about a dozen old TU-4 BULLs similar to our B-29, and two TU-16 BADGER jet bombers.

25X1B

1. [redacted]

2. Their likely immediate goals, however, are probably warheads for short- and medium-range missiles, and possibly a weapon for the IL-28 BEAGLE light jet bomber. The Chinese have about 250 of these aircraft, which have a better chance of reaching a defended target than the BULLs.

C. In the present state of Chinese technology, any weapons they might make now would be crude and inefficient by our standards. By Far Eastern standards, however, they are a significant addition to Chinese military prestige.

IV. The Chinese probably started their missile development by test-firing Soviet MRBMs given them before the Sino-Soviet split in 1960.

A. They may have begun testing their own native versions as early as 1963.

B. Now they are apparently working on several surface-to-surface missile programs.

2. If the Chinese inaugurate a reasonably successful flight test program within the next year or so, they probably could have a few ICBMs deployed by the early 1970s.

3. These probably would be inferior in reliability and accuracy by US standards, but they could--in Chinese eyes--constitute a limited intercontinental deterrent.

D. The Chinese Communists have built one copy of the Soviet G-class submarine. In the Soviet fleet this class is armed with three ballistic missiles of 350-mile range. We have to assume that the Chinese are working on a missile to fit the submarine.

CHINESE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES

I. Despite Chinese progress in advanced weapons, the military power of Communist China for some years to come will derive primarily from the numerical strength of its enormous ground forces--about 2,300,000 men--and great reserves of manpower.

II. There are more than 100 infantry divisions and about a dozen armor and artillery divisions in the Chinese Communist Army, concentrated in the heavily populated regions of eastern China.

A. The Chinese Army probably has the capability to overrun any of its mainland neighbors in short order, provided it does not run into significant opposition from a major power.

1. It has demonstrated its ability to move and fight with primitive transportation and rudimentary logistic support.

2. If it should come to all-out war, however, the Chinese will be badly

hampered by shortages of armor, heavy ordnance, mechanized transport, and fuel.

III. The Chinese air force and navy are oriented primarily toward defensive missions.

A. The bomber force at present consists of 250 jet light bombers--IL-28 BEAGLEs. We believe the Chinese will start producing BADGER jet mediums about 1968.

B. The bulk of the jet fighter force consists of about 1,900 MIG-15s and MIG-17s, obtained 10 or more years ago.

1. Over the past two years, the Chinese have begun assembling supersonic MIG-19s in an aircraft plant at Shen-yang (Mukden) in Manchuria which was provided by the Soviets before 1960. The Chinese inventory of MIG-19s has risen from 150 to about 350, and they have been able to supply another 50 to Pakistan in 1966.

2. The Chinese have about 35 of the Mach-two, delta-wing MIG-21s, probably supplied by the Soviet Union in the early 1960s.

IV. Peking's navy is the weakest element of the Chinese armed forces.

A. It has the world's fourth largest undersea fleet, with 34 submarines, most of them medium-range torpedo attack boats. They have no experience in extended operations, however, and most of their training appears to take place within 20 miles of the coast.

B. The Chinese are building submarines, destroyer escorts, and guided-missile patrol boats. They have four obsolete destroyers, six new DEs, and 11 patrol boats.

Chinese Forces in North Vietnam

V. We estimate that there are 26,000 to 48,000 Chinese Communist military personnel in North Vietnam.

A. As far as we can determine, there are no ground combat formations.

B. Evidence shows that there are two antiaircraft artillery divisions and possibly elements

of two more, manning the 85-millimeter and 100-millimeter guns defending some of the key targets.

C. The rest of the Chinese personnel are mainly railway, engineer, and logistic units, building airfields, bridges, and the like, laying track, and keeping the supplies moving.

Possibility of Chinese Intervention

VI. We believe that there are three situations in which Peking would feel obliged to intervene in force in the Vietnamese fighting.

A. One of these would arise from U.S. air strikes against targets in China. In May 1965, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi asked the British chargé in Peking to pass along a warning to this effect.

B. The second circumstance which would trigger Chinese intervention would be a major U.S. invasion of North Vietnam. Chinese leaders passed this word to a visiting delegation from Ghana, shortly before Chen Yi talked with the British.

C. In addition, if the collapse of the Hanoi Government should seem imminent, China would probably move into North Vietnam to "restore order."

VII. It is always dangerous to assume that the Chinese are going to be guided by rational decisions, but we believe that Peking is bound to feel that the domestic political turmoil and the intensification of the dispute with Moscow leaves China less ready than it might otherwise be to engage in direct hostilities with the United States.

A. Another factor which would contribute to increased Chinese caution would be a growing belief in Peking that the United States is determined to persevere, over the short run at least, in the Vietnamese war.

B. We think, therefore, that the threshold of sensitivity--the level at which Peking would feel forced to fight--has probably been raised a degree or two.

1. For example, a shallow incursion by US troops into the Demilitarized Zone

between North and South Vietnam might be less likely today to trigger a Chinese reaction than it would have been in 1965.

C. Chinese statements concerning the "inevitability" of war with the US now appear only infrequently.

1. Peking has made no mention of "volunteers" for Vietnam since the fall of 1965, except for brief flurries last summer and again in December, after bombings in the area of Hanoi and Haiphong.

2. Peking has always said that the Vietnamese must bear the primary responsibility for fighting; in recent months this theme has been given more emphasis.

CHINESE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

I. Communist China is being racked by the greatest political convulsions since Mao Tse-tung took control in 1949.

A. Mao, at 73, is aging, sick, and more and more inflexible.

1. He is clearly concerned that his Communist Party is losing the revolutionary zeal of its early days, and cannot be relied on to keep China on the right track after he is gone.

2. The teen-aged millions of the Red Guard are supposed to re-kindle that zeal with their youthful and unbridled enthusiasm.

3. When Mao re-appeared last summer after a protracted absence from public view, he passed over the men who had been the heads of the party hierarchy and named Defense Minister Lin Piao (Lin Byaw) as Number Two Man--in effect, Mao's designated successor.

B. To Mao Tse-tung, the cultural revolution is probably primarily a drive to reshape the

the Communist Party, or replace it with a more reliable, more fanatical, and younger version.

C. But for the men who aspire to succeed Mao, it became a naked struggle for power and for survival the minute Mao began to shake up the order of precedence in the leadership.

II. It is difficult to determine from day to day where the cultural revolution stands, who is on which side, or who is going to come out on top. The struggle seems to have entered a critical phase in January.

A. The most dramatic development has been Mao's call for the Red Army to back up the Red Guards and eliminate resistance to the cultural revolution.

1. We had been speculating when the resistance first developed that the army would have been called in even earlier if there were no doubts about its reliability.

2. Now there is evidence that the armed forces are considerably less than monolithic in their loyalty to Mao and Lin.

III. When and how will the turmoil in Peking finally be resolved?

A. We have no idea. The opposing forces, judging by the protracted struggle, must be quite evenly matched. If the clashes between workers and Red Guards spread--particularly if the army's loyalties are divided--then we may soon see something for which there is no other term but Civil War.

1. Some days, it looks as though the opposing elements are digging in for a long winter of political trench warfare.

2. The next day, a war of movement and a showdown may appear imminent.

3. I would say it is still too early to speculate usefully on the outcome.

B. There are two points, however, which we can make.

1. First, as long as China's leaders are pre-occupied with this internal wrangling, they will find it difficult to reach agreement on any new policy lines. So

we do not expect any radical departures from existing policies.

2. Second, whoever wins, we can see no reason for suspecting that there will be any dilution of Peking's implacable hostility to the United States.

Chinese Economy

IV. Finally, a quick look at the Chinese Communist economy:

A. China has regained only part of the ground lost when the Great Leap Forward collapsed in 1960 and Soviet aid was withdrawn.

1. Prospects to regain the momentum of the 1950's appear remote, even without the disruption of the "cultural revolution."

2. The longer the political upheaval lasts, the greater the likelihood of severe damage to the economy.

3. There have already been extensive strikes, shutdowns, and disruption of transportation.

B. It has taken an overriding priority on defense to permit the progress China has made in advanced weapons.

1. One of the ministries hard hit by the waves of political purges and poster denunciations has been a ministry directly related to the missile effort.

C. Stagnation in agriculture remains the chief obstacle to a resumption of adequate economic growth.

1. Peking claims a record harvest in 1966, but actual grain production was somewhat lower in 1966 than in 1955.

2. It wasn't much above the level of 10 years ago, when there were almost 150 million fewer people to feed.

3. There were localized ration cuts, and it was only thanks to grain imports that the average ration could be kept above the lean levels of the poor year of 1960.

4. China imported more than 5 million tons of grain from the Free World in 1966, and will probably have to import substantially more this year.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

I. In view of your interest in the subject of nuclear proliferation, I feel I should give you a run-down on the situation in [redacted] India.

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[redacted]

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

II. The Indian attitude toward development of nuclear weapons has been complicated by Peking's nuclear capability.

A. Prime Minister Gandhi has maintained the government's "no bomb" nuclear policy despite criticism in Parliament.

1. Both the Prime Minister and the new Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Sarabhai, have stated that India's present economic and industrial position does not permit launching a nuclear weapons project, particularly from the viewpoint of developing suitable delivery systems.

B. India has the plutonium production capacity already to fabricate and test a device within a year of a decision to do so.

1. An agreement with Canada, however, stipulates that plutonium produced in the one reactor now operational will be used only for peaceful purposes.

2. Two other reactors which will be operational in 1969 and 1970 are covered by safeguards.

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

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GORE BRIEFING 3 February 1967

BACKSTOPPER

SOVIET BW/CW CAPABILITY

Chemical Warfare

I. Soviet development and testing of chemical warfare agents have been expanding gradually since the nineteenthirties. There are large and sophisticated research and test facilities to support this program.

A. The Soviets are aware of most of the chemical warfare agents known to the West. Their own inventory includes at least one nerve gas agent which may be more toxic than any stockpiled by Western military powers.

1. We have identified more than 20 sites, mainly in the western and central Soviet Union, which we believe to be storage depots for chemical warfare agents.

B. We believe that these stockpiles contain munitions for use by tactical aircraft, missiles, rockets, artillery, and mortars. Soviet troops also have a chemical warfare capability with spray systems, aerosol generators, land mines and grenades.

C. Soviet military leaders assume that the West would use chemical weapons in the event of general war. All elements of the Soviet forces stress defensive chemical warfare training, and Soviet protective equipment for the armed forces is excellent.

Bacteriological Warfare

II. The Soviet Union probably began investigating the concept of biological warfare in the nineteenthirties. References in Soviet scientific literature show a long-standing interest in a variety of diseases which are potential biological warfare agents.

A. There are several sites in the USSR which we suspect are supporting biological warfare research. Testing could also be carried out at some of the chemical warfare research facilities.

B. The Soviet Union has the scientific foundation for a good capability in both the offensive and defensive aspects of biological warfare. The Soviets have probably developed some biological warfare agents, but we have no evidence as to which ones, or the extent of the program.

#

GORE BRIEFING 3 February 1967

BACKSTOPPER

SOVIET RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

I. The Soviets have given maximum support to military research and development since World War II, and it seems clear that they intend to maintain a vigorous program to update their military potential.

A. There have been some shortcomings--rigid planning procedures, overly centralized program direction, compartmentation of research, and--by our standards, poor quality control and poor industrial craftsmanship.

1. The pressure on weapons designers to deliver the goods has encouraged improvement of established technology in preference to new concepts in some fields.

B. At the same time the Soviets have repeatedly shown their willingness--with systems of the highest priority such as the (SS-9 and) SS-11 ~~or the 1962 Leningrad launch complexes~~--to start production and even deployment even before testing and evaluation is completed.

II. Soviet spending for military and space R&D and the procurement of advanced weapons is growing much faster than total defense expenditures. The outlay for the so-called "exotics" has more than doubled since 1958.

A. Most of this increase has gone to R & D, rather than procurement. The Soviets obviously have accorded a high priority to advances in both strategic offense and strategic defense.

B. Estimated expenditures for military and space research, development, testing and evaluation amounted to roughly 4.2 billion rubles in 1965, and are expected to increase to about 6.2 billion rubles by 1970.

C. This represents about 70 percent of the total expenditure for all research and development in the Soviet Union.

III. There is a broad R & D program in strategic offensive missiles. Over the next five to ten years, we expect to see solid-fueled and mobile systems enter the ICBM and MRBM/IRBM forces.

A. There has been no evidence so far of Soviet testing of advanced re-entry concepts, but we would expect to see investigation of penetration aids, maneuverable RV's, and

independently-targeted RV's over the next 10 years.

B. Research and development also continues on all the components of ABM and other defensive missile systems from early-warning and tracking radars to new missiles and probably new warheads.

IV. In space, the Soviets have been working on a long-life, manned orbital space station, and orbital bombardment systems.

A. With optimum progress in development of the necessary booster and spacecraft, the Soviets might be able to orbit a manned space station as early as 1968. They have the capability to orbit a long-life station with advanced performance in the period 1970 to 1975.

B. The new space treaty, together with the greater effectiveness of existing ICBMs, makes it unlikely that the Soviets would push the development of a multiple-orbit bombardment system at this time.

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

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